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CHEVRONIZING AROUND
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
JONATHAN S. MASUR & ERIC A. POSNERT
ABSTRACT
The Trump administration'sefforts to weaken regulations were in
tension with cost-benefit analysis, which in many cases supportedthose
regulations or otherwise failed to support the administration's
deregulatory objectives. Rather than attempting to justify its actions as
a matter of policy preferences, the administration responded on
multiple occasions by using Chevron to interpret statutes so as to evade
cost-benefit analysis. The statutory interpretation route, which we call
"Chevronizing" around cost-benefit analysis, created novel challenges
for courts, as it pitted traditional Chevron deference against a trend in
favor of requiring agencies to regulate based on cost-benefit analysis as
a matter of soundpublic policy. This Article evaluates these efforts and
concludes that in many of these cases, the Trump administration's
attempts to leverage Chevron deference as a weapon against costbenefit analysis-andsensible policymaking-exposed it to significant
legal risk. We expect that courts will reject several of these efforts if they
are ever adjudicated. In the process, the Trump administration's
machinations may have had the effect of contortinghow future courts
apply Chevron deference and how future administrationsdeploy it.
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INTRODUCTION

The Trump administration launched the most significant effort to
deregulate the economy since the Reagan administration.' The
parallels between the two administrations are significant, but there are
many differences as well. Ronald Reagan ran for office on a promise
to deregulate the economy, but he also benefited from political
tailwinds.2 A bipartisan consensus held that the economy was
overregulated, and major deregulatory legislation had already been
enacted during the Carter administration.3 Once in office, Reagan
appointed antiregulatory officials to regulatory agencies, and, working
through the Office of Management and Budget, strengthened the
White House's control over those agencies.4 His most significant
1. See David R. Henderson, Trump's Deregulatory Successes, HOOVER INST., DEFINING
IDEAS (July 7, 2019), https://www.hoover.org/research/trumps-deregulatory-successes [https://
perma.cc/6Z63-8S5R] (discussing, from the perspective of a former economist with President
Ronald Reagan's Council of Economic Advisers, several of the Trump administration's
deregulatory efforts). But see Roundup: Trump-EraAgency Policy in the Courts, INST. FOR POL'Y
INTEGRITY (last updated Jan. 4, 2021), https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup
[https://perma.cc/VJH8-AKDP] (observing that the Trump administration lost 81.6 percent of
litigation over deregulation).
2.

HENRY

OLSEN,

THE WORKING CLASS REPUBLICAN: RONALD REAGAN AND THE

RETURN OF BLUE-COLLAR CONSERVATISM 190 (2017).

3.

See John Howard Brown, Jimmy Carter, Alfred Kahn, and Airline Deregulation:

Anatomy of a Policy Success, 19 INDEP. REV. 85, 91-92 (2014) (noting how the Airline
Deregulation Act, which was signed by President Jimmy Carter in 1987, was sponsored by both
Senator Howard Cannon (D-Nev.) and Senator James B. Pearson (R-Kan.) and supported by
Democrats and Republicans in both houses); Abner J. Mikva, Deregulating Through the Back

Door: The Hard Way To Fight a Revolution, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 524 (1990) ("While the
Republicans had a head start and a better public image on the issue of deregulation, Democrats
strived to catch up. By the 1976 election, Jimmy Carter was on the offensive about deregulation,
talking of sunset provisions ... and zero-based budgeting .... ").
4.

See Jim Tozzi,

OIRA's Formative Years: The HistoricalRecord of CentralizedRegulatory

Review Preceding OIRA's Founding, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 63-67 (2011) (noting how Reagan
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achievement was the creation of centralized regulatory review that
required agencies to use cost-benefit analysis ("CBA") to evaluate
regulatory options.5 Agencies were required to conduct cost-benefit
analyses of all major (in the sense of economically important)
regulations,6 which would permit the administration to evaluate
whether the regulation was worth pursuing. The genius of this move
was that cost-benefit analysis appeared to be a neutral tool of policy
analysis but seemed likely to produce a deregulatory effect because it
was widely believed, by people in both parties, that agencies regulated
excessively.'

administration officials created the first executive order freezing government regulations that had
not gone into effect and established numerous antiregulatory policies, including requiring the
Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") and other White House departments to review
proposed agency regulations); see also Edward P. Fuchs & James E. Anderson, The
Institutionalization of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 10 PUB. PRODUCTIVITY REV. 25, 30-32 (1987)
(describing the regulatory review agencies Reagan created, which were composed of White
House officials); Andrew Rudalevige, Beyond Structure and Process: The Early

Institutionalizationof Regulatory Review, 30 J. POL. HIST. 577, 588-89 (2018) (describing the
creation of Reagan's Presidential Task Force of Regulatory Relief and the administration's
requirement that agencies submit proposed and final drafts of regulations to the OMB for
approval). These deregulatory efforts were not always well received. See Martin Tolchin & Susan
J. Tolchin, The Rush To Deregulate,N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 1983), https://nyti.ms/29JRS2n [https://
perma.cc/U4FX-N3G9] (describing congressional and public criticism of certain Reagan
administration deregulatory efforts).

5.

See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982) (requiring that agencies conduct

"Regulatory Impact Analysis" and report findings to the director of the OMB). For a scholarly
assessment of Reagan's regulatory executive orders, see generally Frank B. Cross, Executive
Orders12,291 and 12,498: A Test Case in PresidentialControl of Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & POL.

483 (1988); see also Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2279
(2001) (concluding the Reagan and Clinton administrations' influence over the regulatory process
was largely beneficial).

6.

Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127.

7. See Jefferson Decker, Deregulation, Reagan-style, REGUL. REV. (Mar. 13, 2019), https://
www.theregreview.org/2019/03/13/decker-deregulation-reagan-style
[https://perma.cc/HFM6VKG7] ("By the late 1970s, a political and intellectual movement that crossed party lines had
begun to rethink the wisdom of much economic regulation . . . . The bipartisan movement
succeeded in federal deregulation of certain industries .... "). As Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.)
once said, "regulators all too often encourage or approve imreasonably [sic] high prices,
inadequate service, and anticompetitive behavior. The cost of this regulation is always passed on
to the consumer. And that cost is astronomical." Oversight of Civil Aeronautics Board Practices
and Procedure:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Admin. Prac. & Proc. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary,94th Cong. 1 (1975) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on
Admin. Prac. & Proc.).
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But while cost-benefit analysis remained in place through the next
four presidential administrations,' it exerted less deregulatory pressure
after Reagan left office.9 It is possible that subsequent presidents put
less priority on deregulation; that regulations that survived the
Reagan-era housecleaning satisfied cost-benefit tests; and that, as new
problems emerged, from climate change to financial instability, it
turned out that additional regulation was cost-justified. Although
deregulation would continue in some sectors, new regulations were
found necessary in others.' 0
In the years leading up to Donald Trump's electoral victory,
regulated
industries
expressed
frustration
with
regulatory
developments, including financial regulation in the wake of the
financial crisis," environmental and energy regulation in response to
climate change," and health care regulation pursuant to the Affordable
Care Act.1 3 Candidate Trump promised to deregulate, and once in
office, he initiated a deregulatory agenda. 4
But in a major irony from the standpoint of the Reagan era, costbenefit analysis now seems to be a hindrance to deregulation. The
deregulations that the Trump administration proposed appear to
8. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and Regulation Under
Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 96 (2016) (noting how each president since Reagan
"extended Reagan's [executive order requiring cost-benefit analysis] with some modifications").
9.

MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT

ANALYSIS 3-4 (2006).
10. Masur & Posner, supra note 8, at 128-33 (discussing an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's accessibility regulation and an Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
regulation of coal- and oil-fired power plants).
11. See, e.g., Randall D. Guynn, The FinancialPanic of 2008 and FinancialRegulatory
Reform, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
(Nov. 20, 2010), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/11/20/the-financial-panic-of-2008-and-financial-regulatory-reform
[https://perma.cc/C7EK-BTNW] ("Critics on the right argued that [the Dodd-Frank Act]
amounted to a vast expansion of Government control over the financial sector without addressing
the real causes of the financial panic .... ").
12. See, e.g., Press Release, Senate Comm. on Energy & Nat. Res., Sen. Murkowski
Expresses
Frustration
with
New ECA
Regulations
(July 27,
2012),
https://
www.energy.senate.gov/2012/7/sen-murkowski-expresses-frustration-with-new-eca-regulations
[https://perma.cc/N8M5-VV9B] (opposing the EPA's Emission Control Area requirements that
decreased the allowable percentage of sulfur for ship fuel, thus making fuel more expensive).
13. See, e.g., Amy Anderson, The Impact of the Affordable Care Act on the Health Care
Workforce, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/

report/the-impact-the-affordable-care-act-the-health-care-workforce
LKNT].

[https://perma.cc/PBR2-

14. See John Stossel, Trump's DeregulationPromise, DAILY SIGNAL (Aug. 22, 2019), https://
www.dailysignal.com/2019/08/22/trumps-deregulation-promise [https://perma.cc/5AJA-7F3W].

2021]

CHEVRONIZING AROUND CBA

1113

violate cost-benefit analysis-primarily because the Obama-era
regulations that the Trump administration sought to repeal are backed
by plausible cost-benefit analyses." This represents a startling shift
from the role that cost-benefit analysis has typically played, and one
that runs directly counter to the caricatured notion of cost-benefit
analysis as necessarily antiregulatory.16
On previous occasions, when a new presidential administration
has decided to alter or undo the regulations promulgated by its
predecessors, the new administration has simply announced that it has
different policy priorities.' But here, the cost-benefit infirmities of
Trump's deregulations seem to have changed the equation. Whether
due to the political cost of deregulating in a cost-benefit unjustified
manner, or due to concern that the regulations would be struck down
by the courts, the Trump administration did not appear willing to bite
the bullet and acknowledge that it chose policies that fail cost-benefit
analysis. Instead, it responded in several different ways. In a few cases,
it simply proposed implausible cost-benefit analyses that do not survive
serious scrutiny. But its most important innovation was to argue, in
several important instances, that deregulation is not merely a policy
choice but is also legally requiredby the underlying regulatory statute.
This approach involved the manipulation of Chevron 8 deferenceunder which agencies have discretionary authority to set policy when
statutes are vague19-to deprive agencies of the power to consider

15. Conversely, a 2019 Council of Economic Advisers report claimed that "the Trump
Administration's new regulatory approach" had and would generate massive gains for the public.
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FEDERAL DEREGULATION SINCE

JANUARY 2017: AN INTERIM REPORT 2 (2019). We are skeptical of this claim, which was based
on a small number of regulatory actions-supposedly representative of all Trump administration
regulations- as well as statutes and other actions outside the scope of this Article. See id. at 4-6.
But in any event the Report did not discuss any of the deregulatory actions we address in this
Article, and so our conclusions are not inconsistent with any of the specific claims that the Report
attempted to document.
16.

See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE

PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 41-47 (2004).

17. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, The Nation He Built, POLITICO (Jan.-Feb. 2016), https://
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/obama-biggest-achievements-213487 [https://perma.
cc/9P8U-5T8Q] (noting that Obama "promised dramatic policy change, vowing to reinvent
America's approach to issues like health care, education, energy, climate and finance"); see also

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("A change in administration brought about by the
people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of
the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations.").

18.
19.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842-44.
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certain benefits generated by regulations. We refer to this tactic as
"Chevronizing around cost-benefit analysis."
In the balance of this Article, we discuss the Trump
administration's deregulatory approach, with a focus on Chevronizing
around cost-benefit analysis. In Part I, we describe four of the Trump
administration's most significant deregulatory efforts and illustrate the
various tactics used to justify them. In Part II, we evaluate these
methods, assess their legality, and discuss possible policy justifications
for the Trump administration's approach. We conclude that the Trump
administration's approach-and in particular, its efforts to Chevronize
around CBA-is suspect from the standpoint of law and policy.
I. TRUMP'S MAJOR DEREGULATIONS
After he took office, Trump sought to roll back many of the
regulatory actions undertaken by the Obama administration. This
deregulatory
effort
primarily
involved
notice-and-comment
rulemaking by administrative agencies that either reversed Obama-era
regulations or replaced them with substantially weaker rules.20 Most of
this activity involved the environmental and power sectors." This
included Obama-era rules on automobile fuel economy, hazardous
pollutants, energy efficiency, and-most notably-the Clean Power
Plan ("CPP"), which was designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
through regulation of electricity generation.22 These are areas in which
the Trump administration made the most progress in reversing Obamaera policy.2 3 In addition, unlike some of Trump's other deregulatory
20. See Juliet Eilperin & Darla Cameron, How Trump Is Rolling Back Obama's Legacy,
WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-rollingback-obama-rules [https://perma.cc/563W-D7F2] (showing that 96 out of 130 deregulatory actions
seeking to reverse Obama-era regulations were Cabinet-level agency decisions); Tracking
Deregulation in the Trump Era, BROOKINGS INST. (last updated Dec. 21, 2020) [hereinafter
Tracking Deregulation], https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/tracking-deregulation-in-thetrump-era [https://perma.cc/U5MK-UV4T] (compiling Trump-era deregulatory actions, a
majority of which involved rules).
21.

Tracking Deregulation,supra note 20.

22. For an overview of the CPP, see Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, EPA
WEB ARCHIVE, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-

plan.html [https://perma.cc/MTT4-9QPW].
23. A 2020 database compiled by the Brookings Institute used filters to categorize the Trump
administration's deregulatory actions by sector, like "Education" and "Telecom." Tracking
Deregulation, supra note 20. The "Environmental" filter produced the most results by a large
margin. Id; see also Nadja Popvich, Livia Albeck-Ripka & Kendra Pierre-Louis, The Trump
Administration Is Reversing Nearly 100 Environmental Rules. Here's the Full List., N.Y. TIMES
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efforts, they involved Obama-era regulations that were justified from
a cost-benefit perspective. In this Part, we examine the four most
significant of these deregulations. Our goal is to expose the legal
mechanisms that the Trump administration deployed to eliminate or
weaken these cost-benefit-justified regulations.
A.

Mercury Regulation

The Trump administration's effort to deregulate mercury
emissions from power plants was the latest step on a long and twisting
path. 5 In 1990, Congress passed an amendment to the Clean Air Act,
which required the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
to regulate mercury emissions among other hazardous pollutants that

it had neglected.26 By the end of the 1990s, the EPA had placed power
plants on a list of significant sources of mercury emissions, triggering a
provision of the law requiring these plants to be regulated under the
demanding Maximum Achievable Control Technology ("MACT")
standard." Before the EPA had a chance to promulgate a rule based
on MACT for those plants, the Clinton administration ended. The
Bush EPA reversed course. Rather than issue MACT standards, the
EPA delisted the power plants, which meant that MACT was not
required.2 8 The EPA proposed a more relaxed regulatory regime
known as the Clean Air Mercury Rule, which imposed a cap-and-trade
system.2 9 However, the Bush rule was struck down in 2008 by the D.C.

(last updated Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trumpenvironment-rollbacks-list.html [https://perma.cc/GS55-D3BA] (summarizing environmental
rules that have been "targeted for reversal").
24.

For example, the Trump administration reversed the Obama-era net neutrality rules. See

Restoring Internet Freedom Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 7852 (Feb. 22, 2018) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R.
pts. 1, 8, 20) ("Finding that transparency is sufficient to protect the openness of the internet and
that conduct rules have greater costs than benefits, the Order eliminates the conduct rules
imposed by the Title II Order."). The Obama Federal Communications Commission, however,
never undertook a cost-benefit analysis of the net neutrality rules. L. Gordon Crovitz, Opinion,
'Economics-Free'Obamanet, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2016, 6:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
economics-free-obamanet-1454282427 [https://perma.cc/4K9C-YA5X].
25. For two useful overviews, see generally Keith Harley, Mercurial but not Swift-U.S.
EPA's Initiative To Regulate Coal Plant Mercury Emissions Changes Course Again as It Enters a

Third Decade, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 277 (2011); James L. Simpson, Why EPA's Mercury and Air
Toxics Standards Matter-Historyand Health, 49 AM. BAR ASS'N 5 (Nov.-Dec. 2017).
26.

Harley, supra note 25, at 280-81.

27.
28.
29.

Id. at 282-83.
Id. at 283-84.
Id. at 284.
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Circuit because the EPA had not complied with the legally required
procedure for delisting a source of hazardous emissions. 30
In 2012, the now-Obama EPA revived the Clinton approach and
issued MACT-based mercury-emission rules for coal- and oil-fired
power plants. 31 These are known as the Mercury and Air Toxics
Standards, but we will call them collectively "the mercury rule" to
avoid acronym overload. The rule was based on studies indicating that
mercury emitted by power plants found its way into water bodies,
where it was consumed by fish that were eaten by consumers. 32 The
mercury levels in these fish posed a threat to the neurological
development of fetuses carried by women who consumed the fish. 33
Thus, the EPA concluded that it was "appropriate and necessary" to

issue regulations, a finding required by § 112(n)(1)(A) of the Clean Air
Act. 34 The mercury rule limited the amount of mercury emissions as
well as emissions of other hazardous substances, and imposed
restrictions on the operation of the power plants. 35 In 2015, the
Supreme Court struck down the mercury rule. 36 The problem was that
the EPA had failed to consider cost when it determined that it was
"appropriate and necessary" to regulate the power plants back in 2000
and again in 2012 when it affirmed the earlier determination. 37 After
conducting additional review to satisfy the Supreme Court's
requirement, the EPA still concluded that the rule was lawful because,

30.

See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 577-78 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("Because coal-fired

EGUs are listed sources under section 112, regulation of existing coal-fired EGUs' mercury
emissions under section 111 is prohibited, effectively invalidating CAMR's regulatory
approach.").
31. EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and OilFired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-FuelFired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-CommercialInstitutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (2012); see also Fact Sheet: Mercury and
Air Toxic Standardsfor Power Plants, Summary, EPA (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter Fact Sheet],
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/20111221matssummaryfs.pdf

[https://perma.cc/69NA-BWUC].
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743,749 (2015).
35.

Fact Sheet, supra note 31.

36.

Michigan, 576 U.S. at 758-60.

37. Id. at 759 ("The Agency must consider cost-including, most importantly, cost of
compliance-before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary.").
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even taking costs into account, the benefits were large enough to justify
the regulation. 38
This set the stage for the Trump administration. The Trump EPA
might have again delisted power plants from the list of hazardous
sources, but, perhaps fearing a repetition of the Bush EPA's debacle,
it chose a different deregulatory approach. Instead of delisting power
plants, the Trump EPA chose to rescind the Obama EPA's earlier
finding that the mercury rule was "appropriate and necessary." 39 Back
in 2011, the Obama administration had issued a cost-benefit analysis
that showed that the rule generated benefits of $37 to $90 billion per
year at a 3 percent discount rate and costs of $9.6 billion.40 In 2016, it
cited that cost-benefit analysis to satisfy the Supreme Court's
requirement that the EPA consider cost when it made its "appropriate
and necessary" determination. 4' By contrast, the Trump EPA
concluded that the cost-benefit analysis, in fact, showed that the
regulation would not be "appropriate and necessary."42 The reason was
that the benefit from the reduction of mercury emissions alone was
only $4 to $6 million per year; 43 the vast bulk of the total benefit was

38. EPA Supplemental Finding that It Is Appropriate and Necessary To Regulate
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units;

Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420, 24,420-21 (Apr. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Supplemental Finding]
(justifying the costs of 40 C.F.R. pts. 63.9980-63.10042).
39. EPA National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units-Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual

Risk and Technology Review, 84 Fed. Reg. 2670, 2670 (proposed Feb. 7, 2019) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 63) [hereinafter Mercury Reconsideration] (rejecting the EPA's Supplemental

Finding justifying the costs of 40 C.F.R. pts. 63.9980-63.10042); EPA National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating
Units-Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and Technology Review, 85

Fed. Reg. 31,286 (Final Rule, May 22, 2020) (adopting in full the agency's proposed course of
action).
40.

EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS

STANDARDS, at ES-1 (2011), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/utilities-ria_final-mats_2011-

12.pdf [https://perma.cc/D94C-K8XQ].
41. See Supplemental Finding, supra note 38, at 24,425 ("Specifically, the EPA estimated
that the final MATS would yield total annual monetized benefits (in 2007 dollars) of between $37
billion to $90 billion using a 3-percent discount rate.").
42. See Mercury Reconsideration, supra note 39, at 2670 (considering the cost of compliance
relative to the Hazardous Air Pollutant ("HAP") benefits of regulation and proposing to find that
"it is not 'appropriate and necessary' to regulate HAP emissions from coal- and oil-fired electric
generating units, thereby reversing the agency's prior conclusion under the Clean Air Act
§ 112(n)(1)(A) and correcting flaws in the agency's prior response to Michigan v. EPA").
43. See id. at 2677 ("The total cost of compliance with MATS ...
monetized HAP benefits of the rule ($4 to $6 million annually).").

vastly outweighs the
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due to the reduction in particulate matter emissions44 that would be
generated by the same regulation. 45 Health benefits caused by
reductions in particulate matter are called "co-benefits,"4 6 because they
result from the regulation, but not from reductions in the pollutant that
is specifically being regulated. 47 For decades, agencies have treated cobenefits as on equal footing with other types of benefits when analyzing
regulations. 48 However, the Trump EPA argued to the contrary,
claiming that the co-benefits of regulating mercury could not be taken
into account. 49 Without including the co-benefits, the cost of the
regulation vastly exceeded the relevant benefit-the reduction in

44. "Particulate matter" is the catch-all term for solid and liquid particles found in the air.
When inhaled, particulate matter can be extremely hazardous to human health. See Particulate
Matter (PM) Basics, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/particulate-matter-pm-basics
[https://perma.cc/AN3B-MGPY] (defining particulate matter and noting its health risks).
Reductions in particulate matter emissions thus lead to high levels of regulatory benefits, as in
this regulation.
45. See Mercury Reconsideration, supra note 39, at 2677 ("[T]he vast majority of estimated
monetized benefits resulting from MATS are associated with reductions ... criteria pollutants
and precursors to criteria pollutants that are already addressed by the cavalcade of statutory
provisions governing levels of these pollutants.").
46. See Supplemental Finding, supra note 38, at 24,440-41 (disagreeing with commentators
who argued it was inappropriate to consider co-benefits, which include health benefits).
47. See Glossary of Climate Change Terms, EPA (Sept. 9, 2013), https://ofmpub.epa.gov/
sor-Internet/registry/termreg/searchandretrieve/glossariesandkeywordlists/search.do?details=&
vocabName=Glossary%20Climate%20Change%20Terms [https://perma.cc/FCN5-CQPU]
(defining co-benefits).
48.

See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR ENV'T ECON., OFF. OF POL'Y, EPA, GUIDELINES FOR

PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 11-2 (2010), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201708/documents/ee-0568-50.pdf [https://perma.cc/H484-UEEZ] (stating that a consideration of
costs and benefits "should include directly intended effects and associated costs, as well as
ancillary (or co-) benefits and costs"); see also, e.g., EPA, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING
LEAD
IN GASOLINE
VI-1-4 (1985), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=
9100YK16.txt [https://perma.cc/T4CY-WL86] (analyzing the co-benefits of reductions in
pollutants other than lead from reducing lead in gasoline).
49. See Mercury Reconsideration, supra note 39, at 2675-76; EPA National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating
Units-Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and Technology Review, 85

Fed. Reg. 31,286, 31,298-99 (May 22, 2020) (to be codified at 40 CFR pts. 63.9980-63.10042);
Connor Raso, Examining the EPA's Proposal To Exclude Co-Benefits of Mercury Regulation,
BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/examining-the-epas("The
[https://perma.cc/48SA-3YFW]
proposal-to-exclude-co-benefits-of-mercury-regulation
EPA (and its allies) argues that co-benefits should not be included to support this required
showing because they do not relate to the primary purpose of the Clean Air Act provision under
which the mercury rule was issued.").
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mercury emissions.50 Although the Trump EPA did not move to
rescind the regulation, it laid the basis for a challenge by regulated
parties.
The Trump EPA's conclusion was based on a legal interpretation
of the Clean Air Act amendments rather than on a new cost-benefit
analysis. Section 112(n)(1)(A) states:

'

The Administrator shall perform a study of the hazards to public
health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by
electric utility steam generating units [that is, power plants] of
pollutants listed under subsection (b) [mercury emissions] after
imposition of the requirements of this chapter .... The Administrator
shall regulate electric utility steam generating units under this section,
if the Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and
necessary after considering the results of the study required by this
subparagraph. 5

The Obama EPA argued-citing the deference to which it is entitled
under Chevron-that it was free to take into account co-benefits when
determining whether a regulation was "appropriate and necessary. "5
This was consistent with long-standing executive branch policy that
favored taking co-benefits into account.53 By contrast, the Trump EPA
took the position that the purpose of § 112(n)(1)(A) is to authorize
regulation of mercury emissions that are needed to address the health
hazards caused by those emissions.54 If the main effect of the rule was
to reduce particulate matter pollution, then it should have been issued
under the section of the Clean Air Act that authorizes the EPA to

50. See Mercury Reconsideration, supra note 39, at 2675-78 (calculating the costs of
regulation without co-benefits and concluding that HAP should not be regulated by controlling
electric generating units, as the cost of the regulation exceeded its benefits).

51.
52.

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2018).
See Supplemental Finding, supra note 38, at 24,439 ("[N]othing in the CAA, or the

supporting legislative history, suggests that benefits associated with pollutants other than the
targeted pollutants are irrelevant to a benefit-cost analysis or must be ignored by the EPA in this

context.").
53.

The OMB circular instructs:

Your analysis should look beyond the direct benefits and direct costs of your
rulemaking and consider any important ancillary benefits and countervailing risks. An
ancillary benefit is a favorable impact of the rule that is typically unrelated or secondary
to the statutory purpose of the rulemaking (e.g., reduced refinery emissions due to
more stringent fuel economy standards for light trucks).
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4 (2003), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/
circularsa004_a-4 [https://perma.cc/WP3P-PVVB].
54.

Mercury Reconsideration, supra note 39, at 2676.
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regulate particulate matter." The agency presumably believed that a
court, under Chevron, would ultimately give deference to this
interpretation.
B.

The Clean Power Plan

The Trump administration's most controversial regulatory
achievement was the EPA's repeal of the Obama EPA's CCP 56 and its
replacement with the Affordable Clean Energy initiative. The CPP was
the Obama administration's most significant regulatory attempt to
reduce the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases,
with the goal of slowing, or eventually stopping, climate change. The
CPP required states to drastically reduce the quantity of greenhouse
gases emitted within their borders." Other air pollutants such as sulfur
dioxide or particulate matter are typically "captured" or eliminated at
the mouth of a smokestack or the tailpipe of a car.58 By contrast, the
technology to capture carbon dioxide after a fossil fuel has been burnt
is still in its infancy, 59 and it is unclear whether it can be produced costeffectively at scale. 60 Accordingly, the CPP would have required states
to switch the mixture of fuels used to produce electricity within their
55. See id. ("[T]hese statements acknowledging that reductions in HAP can have the
collateral benefit of reducing non-HAP emissions and vice versa, provides no support for the
proposition that any such co-benefits should be the Agency's primary consideration when making

a finding under CAA section 112(n)(1)(A)." (emphasis added)).
56.

Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility

Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60)
[hereinafter Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources].

57.

Id. at 64,673, 64,826-27.

58. See China Zmuida, How To Remove Pollutantsfrom Smokestacks, SCIENCING (Nov. 22,
2019), https://sciencing.com/how-6340282-remove-pollutants-smokestacks.html
[https://
perma.cc/YNJ7-TX46] ("To control air pollution, methods for keeping smokestacks clean are
needed to minimize the output of particulates and gas emissions."); CapturingC02 Directlyfrom
Truck Exhaust and Reducing Emissions 90%, SCITECHDAILY (Dec. 31, 2019), https://
scitechdaily.com/capturing-co2-directly-from-truck-exhaust-and-reducing-emissions-90
[https://
perma.cc/WPY7-XMZ6] (describing the process of capturing carbon dioxide directly in the
trucks' exhaust system).
59. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy Announces $110M
for Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.energy.gov/articles/usdepartment-energy-announces-110m-carbon-capture-utilization-and-storage [https://perma.cc/
TZU6-STCJ] (announcing up to $110 million in federal investment in carbon capture, utilization,
and storage research and development, and noting the technology's "transformative potential").
60. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources, supra note
56, at 64,689, 64,727, 64,756 (noting that carbon capture technology is "energy resource intensive,"
expensive because of its integrated electricity systems, and more expensive than other systems of
emissions reductions).
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borders, decreasing the use of coal and increasing the use of (cleaner)
natural gas and renewables. 61
The benefits that would have been generated by the CPP fall into
two categories. First, the CPP would have reduced total nationwide
emissions of greenhouse gases, particularly carbon dioxide, thus
decreasing the effects of climate change. 62 The Obama EPA estimated
the carbon dioxide reductions would produce approximately $20
billion in annual benefits by 2030.63 In addition, the overall reduction
in coal-fired power plants would have reduced emissions of particulate
matter and a number of other air pollutants that can be highly
dangerous to health.64 Like the mercury regulation described above,
these were considered co-benefits. 65 These additional emissions
reductions were expected to yield approximately $24 billion in annual
health benefits by the year 2030, for a total of $44 billion in benefits. 66
The Obama EPA further predicted that the CPP would generate
roughly $8.4 billion in costs. 67 It thus appeared that the CPP would
generate benefits that substantially exceeded its costs.

Trump's Affordable Clean Energy ("ACE") plan, promulgated in
July 2019, reversed Obama's CPP. 68 Thus, in performing a cost-benefit
analysis of the ACE plan, the Trump EPA effectively recalculated all
of the costs and benefits of the CPP to determine the economic effects

61. See Daniel A. Farber, Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times, 94 CHI-KENT L.
REV. 383, 419-21 (2019) ("[I]n order to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, the Plan would require
utilities to scale back electricity generation at coal-fired plants in favor of generators using natural
gas or renewable sources.").
62.

See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN POWER PLAN FINAL

RULE, at ES-10 (2015) [hereinafter RIA CLEAN POWER PLAN], https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecasl/
docs/ria/utilitiesria_final-clean-power-plan-existing-units_2015-08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9Z8NKGBE] (noting that the CPP's emission guidelines would lower the ozone concentration level).
63. Id. at ES-20 tbl.ES-7. This is based on a 3 percent discount rate. The Obama Regulatory
Impact Analysis did not report cumulative benefits over a multiyear period. Instead, it reported
only expected benefits for particular years in the future, which is why we refer to the benefits in
2030 in the text above.

64.
65.

Id. at ES-10.
Id.

66. Id. at ES-20 tbl.ES-7. The EPA reported the expected total benefits as a range of $34 to
$54 billion (using a 3 percent discount rate). We report the midpoint of that range here. Again,
the Obama EPA did not calculate total estimated benefits, only annual benefits for certain years.

67.

Id. at ES-22 tbl.ES-9.

68. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing

Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520, 32,521 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60)
[hereinafter Repeal of Clean Power Plan].
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of repealing that rule. Trump's economic analysis differed substantially
from Obama's. First, the Trump EPA announced that it would include
only domestic climate benefits in its analysis, not worldwide climate
benefits. 69 That is, it counted only the benefits that would be felt by
people living within the United States.70 The domestic costs of climate
change are expected to be only a small fraction of the worldwide costs,
in part because the United States has only 5 percent of the world's
population and only 20 percent of its economic activity.7' Accordingly,
the Trump EPA predicted that the CPP would have generated only
$500 million in annual benefits from lower emissions of greenhouse
gases,7 2 a 97.5 percent reduction from the Obama EPA's $20 billion
calculation.
In addition, the Trump EPA took a different approach from the
Obama EPA in deciding how to count the benefits from reductions in
particulate matter and other non-greenhouse gas pollutants. The
Trump EPA did not treat these co-benefits as zero, as the
administration did in the mercury regulation. 73 However, it counted an
emissions reduction as a benefit only if that reduction would not have
been required under existing law. 74 The Obama EPA, by contrast, had
counted emissions reductions as benefits if the CPP had required
69.

EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR

GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING ELECTRICUTILITY GENERATING UNITS; REVISIONS
TO EMISSION GUIDELINE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS; REVISIONS TO NEW SOURCE REVIEW

PROGRAM 4-3 (2018) [hereinafter RIA FOR PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES], https://www.epa.gov/
sites/production/files/2018-08/documents/utilities_riaproposedace_2018-08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
W2RE-T7Z3] (following the guidance of Executive Order 13,783 and adopting a domestic perspective
in the central analysis).
70. Id. at ES-10; see also Farber, supra note 61, at 415-17 (analyzing Executive Order
13,783's requirement that agencies consider only domestic costs and benefits). See generally
Arden Rowell, Foreign Impacts and Climate Change, 39 HARV. ENV'T L. REV. 371 (2015)
(exploring U.S. agencies' increasing analysis of global impact of emissions, despite the traditional
practice of only looking at domestic impact without considering their statutory authority to
analyze global impact).
71. Approximately 95 percent of the costs of climate change will likely be borne by people
living outside of the United States. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and

the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1591-92 (2011); Economy & Trade,
OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/economy-trade
[https://
perma.cc/4ZGZ-2D5H] ("Americans generate and earn more than 20 percent of the world's total
income.").
72.

RIA FOR PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES, supra note 69, at ES-13 tbl.ES-9.

73. Id. at ES-10 ("We refer to air pollution health benefits as ancillary 'co-benefits' because
they result from policies affecting C0 2, but are not the goal of this policy.").
74. Id. at ES-10-11 (noting that its "modeling accounted for the current suite of local, state
and federal policies expected to reduce PM2.5 and PM2.5 precursor emissions in future years").
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reductions below current pollution levels. 75 In other words, imagine
that the CPP would have effectively capped emissions of particular
matter in some area of the country at 50 units per year. If current law
limited emissions to 100 units per year, but polluters were currently
producing 150 units per year, the Obama EPA would have estimated
the benefits of the CPP based on a reduction of 100 units per year (150
minus 50), while the Trump EPA would have estimated those same
benefits based on a reduction of 50 units per year (100 minus 50).76
After making this change, the Trump EPA estimated the annual cobenefits from these reductions at approximately $8.1 billion, down
from the $24 billion estimated by the Obama EPA."7
Despite these changes, the Trump EPA reported that its repeal of
the Obama CPP would produce costs well in excess of benefits.
Repealing the CPP was expected to produce net annual costs of
approximately $4.5 billion, 78 or $54 billion in total costs through the
year 2037.79 The Trump EPA also offered a variety of different options
involving partial repeals of the CPP-all of those options failed a costbenefit test as well. Even despite the differences in CBA methodology,
the Trump EPA could not escape the conclusion that the Obama CPP
would produce benefits that exceeded its costs. 80
75. See RIA CLEAN POWER PLAN, supra note 62, at ES-17 ("[W]e multiplied the benefitper-ton estimates by the corresponding emission reductions that were generated from air quality
modeling of the proposed Clean Power Plan.").
76. To be clear, it is entirely possible that the Trump EPA's approach-both with respect to
greenhouse gases and non-greenhouse gases-was superior and better-justified. Our goal here is
not to criticize the choices made by the Trump EPA in the course of its cost-benefit analysis.
Rather, our objective is to examine the effects of the Trump EPA's decision on its overall costbenefit analysis, as well as the EPA's legal approach in light of that cost-benefit analysis.
77. RIA FOR PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES, supra note 69, at ES-13 tbl.ES-9. Here, too,
the EPA reported estimated annual benefits as a range from $4.9 to $11.4 billion, again using a 3
percent discount rate. We report the midpoint of that range.

78.

Id. at ES-16 tbl.ES-12. This is the midpoint of a range of $3.1 to $6.8 billion, using a

discount rate of 3 percent. In between the promulgation of the CPP and Trump's re-estimation of
its costs and benefits, the estimated compliance costs also fell. Compare id. (estimating annual
compliance costs of $400 million), with EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN
POWER PLAN FINAL RULE, at ES-22 tbl.ES-9 (2015), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecasl/docs/ria/
utilities_ria_final-clean-power-plan-existing-units_2015-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK87-DKFC]
(estimating annual compliance costs of $1 billion or more).
79. RIA FOR PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES, supra note 69, at ES-16 tbl.ES-12. This is
the midpoint of a range of $37.2 to $81.5 billion, using a discount rate of 3 percent.
80. In an updated CBA issued a year after its first assessment, the Trump EPA took an
entirely different (and even less plausible) tack. There, it argued that secular trends in the energy
industry put the country on track to meet the CPP's emissions targets even without legal
intervention. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE REPEAL OF THE CLEAN POWER
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To justify its deregulation, the Trump administration adopted a
legal tactic reminiscent of its Chevronizing approach to the mercury
regulation. The Clean Air Act directs the EPA to establish "standards
of performance for any existing source"81 and then defines "standard
of performance" to mean:
a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of
emission limitation achievable through the application of the best
system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of
achieving such reduction and any nonair quality health and
environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator
determines has been adequately demonstrated. 82

The Obama EPA argued that a "system of emission reduction" was
capacious enough to encompass plans requiring electricity producers
to switch some production from coal-fired power plants to natural gasfired plants or renewable sources. 83 That is, the Obama EPA believed
that it could set emissions guidelines "that would generally require
power generators to change their energy portfolios," rather than
requiring "technological or operational measures that can be applied
to or at a single source." 84

PLAN, AND THE EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING

ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS 2-1 (2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2019-06/documents/utilities_ria_final_cpp_repeal_and_ace_2019-06.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
R8XW-E83L]. According to the EPA, power generators were phasing out coal-fired power plants
on their own and would continue doing so. Id. at 2-4. It is difficult to believe that this trend would
have begun without the CPP or that it would continue if the CPP were definitively repealed. This
is akin to installing a stop sign at a busy intersection, observing that traffic accidents have
decreased substantially, and concluding that the stop sign was never needed. The analogy is not
perfect because implementation of the CPP was stayed by a court pending the Trump EPA's
repeal. Nonetheless, it strains credulity to imagine that power generators would have taken these
actions without the threat of EPA regulation (and the possibility that regulation might be
reinvigorated under a subsequent administration). What is more, if the CPP would produce no
costs and benefits, as the EPA now claims, there is no meaningful reason to repeal it, and the
EPA has not supplied one. Id. at 2-1.

§ 7411(d)(1)

81.
82.

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
Id. § 7411(a)(1).

(2018).

83.

See Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 68, at 32,523; Farber, supra note 61, at 421.

84.

Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:

Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,037 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines]; see
also Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility
Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New

Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746, 44,748 (proposed Aug. 31, 2018) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pts. 51-52, 60). This is sometimes referred to as regulation "outside of the fence-line."
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The Trump EPA disagreed with this position. It argued instead
that the text of the statute required that a "standard of performance"
be applied only to each "existing source" individually, rather than
involving the simultaneous shifting of capacity from "sources," such as
coal-fired plants, to "non-sources," such as nuclear plants or
renewables. 5 The EPA argued that this reading was compelled by both
the reference to "any existing source" and by the use of the word
"application," claiming that "application" requires a particular
object-an individual power plant-to which the system of emission
reduction would be applied.86 Accordingly, the EPA concluded that the
agency "is precluded from basing [its regulatory approach] on
strategies like generation shifting and corresponding emissions offsets
because these types of systems cannot be put into use at the regulated
building, structure, facility, or installation." 87
It is notable that, after initially invoking its authority under
Chevron to justify its changing interpretation,88 the Trump EPA
disclaimed any reliance on Chevron in announcing the final rule.
Instead, the agency argued that the language of the Clean Air Act was
unambiguous, and thus, there was "no interpretive room on which the
EPA could seek deference for the CPP's grid-wide management
approach." 89 That is, the agency argued that its hands were tied at
Chevron Step One: the statute did not permit the type of regulation the

Obama EPA had promulgated.
CorporateAverage Fuel Economy Standards

C.

1. Federal Fuel Economy Rules. In 2012, the National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") and the EPA together
promulgated new corporate average fuel economy ("CAFE")
standards that applied to cars and light trucks beginning in Model Year

Rachel Jacobson, Trump Administration Issues Affordable Clean Energy Rule, WILMERHALE
(June 25, 2019), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20190625-trumpadministration-issues-affordable-clean-energy-rule [https://perma.cc/NVE5-XJCY].
85.

Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 68, at 32,523-24.

86.
87.

Id. at 32,524.
Id.

88.

Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, supra note 84, at 48,039.
89. Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 68, at 32,532. In legal terms, this means the
agency argued that the case should be decided at Chevron Step One, whereby Chevron deference
does not apply to unambiguous legislative commands. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
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2017.90 CAFE standards are imposed on a manufacturer-bymanufacturer basis 91: each automobile manufacturer is required to
meet a specified average fuel economy standard across all of the
automobiles sold by that manufacturer in a given year.9 2 Manufacturers
can improve their average fuel economy by improving the fuel
economy of individual cars or simply by selling more small cars, which
have higher fuel economy, and fewer large cars, which have lower fuel
economy. Under the Department of Transportation ("DOT") and
EPA regulations, the formula for calculating the precise fuel economy
standard was complex and dependent upon the price of oil in a given
year, 93 but the effects were likely to be dramatic. The agencies
anticipated that the average fuel economy across a manufacturer's
entire fleet of passenger cars would rise from roughly 39 miles per

gallon ("mpg") in 2017 to roughly 55 mpg in 2025, and from roughly 29
mpg in 2017 for light trucks to roughly 40 mpg in 2025.94
The heightened fuel economy standards were expected to produce
significant net benefits. NHTSA estimated that the regulations would
impose costs of roughly $155 billion but create benefits of $630 billion,
thus producing net benefits of $475 billion. 95 The majority of the costs
were so-called "technology" costs-the costs of developing and
installing more fuel-efficient engines. 96 But one of the consequences of
improved fuel economy is that individuals who own cars are likely to
drive them more because they are cheaper to operate. 97 NHTSA thus
estimated that the regulation would create an additional $19 billion in
costs from additional roadway congestion-due to cars being driven

90.

2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and

Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012) (codified at 40
C.F.R pts. 85-86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 536-37).
91.

Hence, the "corporate" in "corporate average fuel economy."

92. See CorporateAverage Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards, U.S. DEP'T TRANSP. (Aug. 11,
2014), https://www.transportation.gov/mission/sustainability/corporate-average-fuel-economy-cafestandards [https://perma.cc/8DJ6-SRW7].
93.

See

NAT'L

HIGHWAY

TRAFFIC SAFETY

ADMIN.,

FINAL

REGULATORY

IMPACT

ANALYSIS, CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY FOR MY 2017-MY 2025 PASSENGER CARS

AND

LIGHT TRUCKS 207 (2012)

[hereinafter

OBAMA

RIA],

https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/

nhtsa.dot.gov/files/fria_2017-2025.pdf [https://perma.cc/LL3D-N2M3] (explaining that the CAFE
model considered the extent to which manufacturers might apply fuel-saving technology "in
consideration of future fuel prices").

94.

Id. at 14-15 tbls.3a-b.

95.

This considers automobiles produced through Model Year 2025. Id. at 13 tbl.2.

96.

These accounted for roughly $120 billion of the $155 billion in total costs. Id. at 49 tbl.13.

97.

This is known as the "rebound effect." See id. at 847.
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more miles-and $9 billion in costs from additional automobile
accidents. 98
On the benefits side, the primary expected benefit was a reduction
in lifetime fuel expenditures by the owners of more fuel-efficient cars,
approximately $485 billion. 99 But NHTSA estimated that there would
be significant additional benefits from the regulation as well, including
benefits from reduced greenhouse gas emissions ($49 billion) and
reduced particulate matter and sulfur emissions ($13 billion in total).' 00
In 2020, Trump's EPA and NHTSA announced a rule
substantially amending the Obama-era CAFE standards with respect
to Model Year 2021 and later automobiles.1 ' Trump's rule increased
fuel efficiency standards only very slightly from their 2020 levels, to
47.1 mpg for cars and 34.1 mpg for light trucks in model year 2030,
rather than the more substantial increases to 55 mpg for cars and 40
mpg for light trucks required under the Obama administration rule.1 2
Accordingly, whereas the Obama-era rule was expected to generate
significant net benefits, one might have expected that the Trump-era
rule-which largely reverses the Obama rule-would generate
significant net costs.

But this is not what the Trump EPA and NHTSA initially
concluded. In their first attempt to calculate the costs and benefits of
this new rule, those agencies estimated that fully repealing the Obama
CAFE standards would avoid $502 billion in costs and reduce benefits

by only $326 billion, for a net gain of $176 billion.1 03 This CBA

98. Id. at 49 tbl.13.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 50 tbl.13.
101. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (Apr. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 85-86).
102.

NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.

& EPA, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT

ANALYSIS, THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUEL-EFFICIENT (SAFE) VEHICLES RULE FOR MODEL

YEAR 2021-2026 PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS 11 tbl.I-3 (Mar. 2020) [hereinafter
FINAL TRUMP RIA], https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/final-safefria_

webversion_200701.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE7L-DHRG].
103.

NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. & EPA, PRELIMINARY REGULATORY

IMPACT ANALYSIS, THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUEL-EFFICIENT (SAFE) VEHICLES RULE FOR

MODEL YEAR 2021-2026 PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS 17 tbl.1-5 (July 2018)
[hereinafter PRELIMINARY TRUMP RIA], https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/

documents/ld-cafeco2_nhtsa_2127-al76_epa-pria_181016.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLU2-MR6W].
Avoided costs are effectively benefits, and foregone benefits are effectively costs, hence the
positive overall impact in this calculation.
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conducted by Trump's agencies considered a slightly different time
period than the one conducted by Obama's agencies, so the
comparison is not quite one-to-one.1 04 These minor discrepancies aside,
the end result was a substantial divergence between the Obama
administration's calculation that stricter fuel economy standards would
produce significant net benefits and the Trump administration's
calculation that stricter standards would produce significant net costs.
The vast divide between the Obama and Trump administrations'
calculations was driven by a number of factors. First, the Trump
administration estimated significantly higher technology costs than
Obama. For instance, the Obama NHTSA predicted roughly $90
billion in technology costs for Model Year 2021-25 automobiles.10 5 By
contrast, the Trump NHTSA estimated that technology costs would
exceed $123 billion across those five years.1 06 Second, the Trump EPA
calculated carbon emissions benefits and costs using the domestic cost
of carbon,10 7 while the Obama EPA used the global cost of carbon.1 08
Accordingly, where the Obama EPA estimated benefits from higher

CAFE standards of roughly $36 billion across Model Years 2021-25,109
the Trump EPA calculated the cost of foregone climate benefits from
those years as only $2.6 billion." 0
Most importantly, the Trump administration estimated that
Obama's stricter fuel economy standards would lead to an enormous
increase in the total number of miles that individuals drive their cars
each year."' Whereas the Obama EPA calculated the fuel cost savings
from tighter fuel economy standards for Model Year 2021-25
automobiles at more than $350 billion," 2 Trump's estimate came in

104. Compare OBAMA RIA, supra note 93, at 56 (considering model years 2017-25), with
PRELIMINARY TRUMP RIA, supra note 103, at 129 (considering model years 2021-26). For
instance, it is not necessarily significant that Trump estimated $502 billion in cost savings while
Obama estimated total costs of only $155 billion.
105.

OBAMA RIA, supra note 93, at 49 tbl.13.

106.

PRELIMINARY TRUMP RIA, supra note 103, at 84 tbl.1-73.

107.

See id. at 11.

108.

See OBAMA RIA, supra note 93, at 904.

109. Id. at 50 tbl.13. This number was calculated by adding the values for carbon dioxide from
the years 2021 to 2025.
110. PRELIMINARY TRUMP RIA, supra note 103, at 85 tbl.1-73. This number was calculated
by combining the values for carbon dioxide damage reduction benefit from the years 2021 to 2025.
111. See id. at 993 (predicting a rebound effect of 20 percent, twice the Obama EPA's
number).
112.

See OBAMA RIA, supra note 93, at 49 tbl.13.
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under $82 billion.113 The reason, according to the Trump
administration, was that the benefits to consumers of better fuel
economy would be nearly outweighed by the fuel costs of the
additional miles those consumers would drive." 4 Relatedly, the Obama
EPA estimated that tighter fuel economy standards would yield small
reductions in fatalities from driving." 5 Individuals would drive
somewhat more, but the cars they drove would be newer and smaller,
and thus safer. By contrast, the Trump administration estimated that
loosening the fuel economy standards would save 6,340 lives,11 6 which
it valued at an additional $35.4 billion, because people would be less
likely to drive cars that were more expensive to operate." These
estimates-particularly the claim that stricter fuel economy standards
would lead to enormous increases in driving-were widely viewed as
implausible,"l8 and the agencies received significant criticism for their

113.

PRELIMINARY TRUMP RIA, supra note 103, at 84 tbl.1-73.

114.

See id.

115. See OBAMA RIA, supra note 93, at 50 tbl.13 (finding the value of reduced fatalities over
the fifteen-year total to be between $9 and $568 million).
116.

PRELIMINARY TRUMP RIA, supra note 103, at 92 tbl.1-77.

117. Id. at 84 tbl.1-73. In addition, if consumers would drive much more with stricter fuel
standards (the Obama regulation) than they would with weaker fuel standards (the Trump
deregulation), this should also mean that they gain much greater consumer surplus from driving
with stricter fuel standards. If a driver owns a car with better fuel economy and chooses to drive
twenty miles instead of ten, the driver must be getting some welfare benefit from the additional
miles driven, despite the fact that she is paying for more gas to drive the additional miles.
Accordingly, if the Trump EPA estimated that total vehicle miles driven would drop substantially
under its deregulation, it should have also estimated that total consumer surplus from driving
would drop substantially. But in fact, the Trump EPA's estimate of consumer surplus from driving
was almost identical to the Obama EPA's estimate. Compare OBAMA RIA, supra note 93, at 49
tbl.13, with PRELIMINARY TRUMP RIA, supra note 103, at 84 tbl.1-73 (showing roughly identical
numbers for consumer surplus in Model Years 2021-25). The Trump EPA does not attempt to
explain or justify how it arrived at this calculation, so it is difficult to evaluate. But on its face, it
appears implausible.
118. According to the Trump EPA's analysis, weakening fuel economy standards would
actually decrease the total number of cars on the road, even though new cars would be cheaper to
purchase. See Alan Krupnick, Joshua Linn & Virginia McConnell, Critiquing the Trump
Administration'sAnalysis of Consumer Behavior in the Proposed CAFE Standards, RES. FOR
FUTURE (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/critiquing-thetrump-administrations-analysis-of-consumer-behavior-in-the-proposed-cafe-standards
[https://
perma.cc/BW8Y-SS3E] (noting "the agencies' argument that weakening the standards reduces
the total size of the on-road fleet"). The agency's reason was that the higher price of new cars
under the Obama rule would make used cars more valuable, and so more people would choose
to hold onto their used cars. See id. (explaining that "tighter standards raise used vehicle prices
and delay scrappage of old vehicles"). That is, the Trump EPA estimated that higher fuel
economy standards would make new cars more expensive, leading to fewer new cars on the road.
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calculations during the regulatory comment period.119 Cost-benefit
analysis is subject to judicial review under the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"). 20 Regulations have been struck down as arbitrary and
capricious when they rely on obviously unjustified or nonsensical costbenefit analyses,121 though review is often deferential.1 22 Nonetheless,
the agencies' dubious cost-benefit analysis at minimum created some
risk that the regulation would not survive judicial scrutiny.

This would in turn make used cars more valuable, leading to more used cars on the road and fewer
used cars being scrapped. The net result, according to the Trump EPA, would be more total cars
on the road in a world with stricter fuel economy standards. However, this conclusion contradicts
basic principles of supply and demand, see Alan Krupnick, Joshua Linn & Virginia McConnell,
QuestionsAbout the Trump Administration's Cost-Benefit Analysis for Its ProposalTo Freeze the
CAFE Standards, RES. FOR FUTURE (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-

resources/questions-about-the-trump-administrations-cost-benefit-analysis-for-its-proposal-tofreeze-the-cafe-standards
[https://perma.cc/Y3BB-HX5U]
(describing
the
Trump
administration's proposal as being "inconsistent with economics"), as well as with previous studies
of CAFE standards, which found that lower standards are associated with more cars on the road,
id. The Trump administration also assumed that increasing the number of cars on the road by 10
percent would increase the number of miles driven by 10 percent, even if the number of drivers
did not increase, which similarly seems to defy logic. See SYLWIA BIALEK, BETHANY DAVIS
NOLL, PETER HOWARD, RICHARD REVESZ, JASON SCHWARTZ& AVI ZEVIN, INST. FOR POL'Y
INTEGRITY,

COMMENT

REGARDING THE SAFER AFFORDABLE

FUEL-EFFICIENT

(SAFE)

VEHICLES RULE FOR MODEL YEARS 2021-2026 PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS 79

(2018) [hereinafter INST. FOR POL'Y INTEGRITY, COMMENT], https://policyintegrity.org/
documents/EmissionsStandardsEPANHTSACommentsOct2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
Z8JC-BG75] (explaining that the Trump administration's conclusion that the increase in total
fleet size would automatically lead to an increase in the total vehicle miles traveled was illogical).
119. See generally INST. FOR POL'Y INTEGRITY, COMMENT, supra note 118 (offering
quantitative critiques of many of the calculations in the Trump administration's cost-benefit
analysis);

see

also JOSHUA

LINN,

ALAN

KRUPNICK,

BENJAMIN

LEARD

&

VIRGINIA

MCCONNELL, COMMENTS TO NHTSA AND U.S. EPA ON THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUELEFFICIENT (SAFE) VEHICLES RULE FOR MODEL YEARS 2021-2026: PASSENGER CARS AND

LIGHT TRUCKS 18 (2018), https://media.rff.org/documents/Comments_10-25-18_EPA-NHTSA_

final.pdf [https://perma.cc/M582-QL5E].
120. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018); see Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46 (1983) (subjecting a rescission order of NHTSA to the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard). Other commentators agree with this stance. INST. FOR POL'Y INTEGRITY,
COMMENT, supra note 118, at 10.
121. See generally Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 575 (2015) (surveying a large number of cases in which courts
have evaluated agency cost-benefit analyses and finding that appellate courts have rejected many
CBAs for being faulty).
122. See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin RationalityReview, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355,
1358 (2016) (finding that agencies have won 92 percent of arbitrariness challenges at the Supreme
Court).
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In response, the Trump administration issued a substantially
revised cost-benefit analysis when it finalized the rule in April 2020.
The agencies' improbably high projections of cost savings from
loosening fuel economy standards had been replaced by much smaller
estimates. Rather than saving 6,340 lives, the Trump rule was now
projected to save 3,344 lives.1 23 The Trump EPA's estimate of the
foregone climate benefits from loosening fuel economy standards
doubled, from $2.6 billion to $5.2 billion.1' And the agencies' estimate
of the foregone fuel savings more than doubled, from $82 billion to
$185.1 billion.1 5 All told, the Trump administration now calculated
that loosening fuel economy standards would generate negative
benefits of $13.1 billion. 2 6 That is, this new regulation would do more
harm than good."
This is a startling admission. As with the CPP, it is remarkable that
an agency with every political incentive to doctor its cost-benefit
analysis could not produce a plausible CBA that yielded its desired
conclusion. Some scholars have suggested that CBA can be easily
manipulated to yield whatever result a policymaker desires. 2 8 The

123.

FINAL TRUMP RIA, supra note 102, at 11 tbl.I-3.

124.
125.

Id. at 48 tbl.I-74.
Id.
Id. at 49 tbl.I-74. Again, the comparison is not quite apples-to-apples with the prior

126.
Trump CBA. In its final rule, the Trump administration allowed fuel economy standards to rise
very slightly (by about 3 mpg over the course of a decade) from the Model Year 2020 levels set
by Obama, rather than holding them constant. See id. at 15-16, tbls.I-8 & I-10. This would tend to
depress the Trump administration's calculation of benefits. On the other hand, the final CBA
calculated costs and benefits through 2029, rather than 2026 as in the earlier CBA. See id. at 14
tbl.I-6. This would tend to inflate the administration's calculation of benefits. These minor
discrepancies are not enough to account for the full difference between the two cost-benefit
analyses (which totaled nearly $190 billion), particularly given that they pull in opposite
directions.

127. The EPA and NHTSA noted that using a discount rate of 7 percent for future costs and
benefits, rather than 3 percent, the rule would create $16.1 billion in benefits (instead of $13.1
billion in costs), and thus that the expected "net benefits straddle zero." Id. at 9. Nonetheless,
there are strong reasons to believe that 3 percent (or lower) is a more appropriate discount rate
than 7 percent. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the
Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267 (1993)
(arguing for lower discount rates). But even if one places that point to the side, it is remarkable
that the EPA and NHTSA admitted that this deregulation would yield negative benefits under a
set of typical (if not preferred) assumptions.
128.

See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE

OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 61-90 (2004); Rebecca M. Bratspies, Regulatory
Trust, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 618 n.230 (2009) ("Recent attempts to reduce the assumed value of
a human life in calculating costs and benefits, a change that would obviously reduce the benefits
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Trump administration's experiences with the CPP and the CAFE
standards rollback stand as evidence to the contrary and demonstrate
CBA's robustness in the face of political machinations.
Nonetheless, the fuel economy deregulation may face an
uncertain future in the courts. Courts have struck down regulations as
arbitrary and capricious when their CBAs appeared obviously faulty
or revealed that the regulation's costs would exceed its benefits, as is
the case here.1 29 Cost-benefit analysis has already exerted a disciplining
force on the Trump administration once, when it required the EPA and
NHTSA to revise its initial implausible estimates. It may exert such a
force again if a court rejects the fuel economy deregulation wholesale.
2. California'sClean Air Act Waiver. As it turned out, eliminating
the Obama-era CAFE standards and replacing them with much weaker
fuel economy rules did not, by itself, succeed in lowering national fueleconomy standards. The state of California has authority under the
Clean Air Act to promulgate air quality standards that are more
stringent than federal air quality standards.1 30 To do so, California must
obtain a waiver from the EPA that exempts it from being preempted
by federal rules.13' California has received dozens of such waivers in

attributable to health and safety regulation, graphically reveal how malleable costbenefit analysis can be."); Farber, supra note 61, at 432 ("[T]he experience of the Trump
Administration may strengthen the argument that cost-benefit analysis is too malleable to be
considered reliable."); Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit
Analysis: A PragmaticReorientation,32 HARV. ENV'T L. REV. 433, 446 (2008) ("[W]e know that
CBA is easily biased by an analyst's policy preferences because the methodology depends
on malleable inferences and assumptions."); Mark Eliot Shere, Building Trust: Conservatives and
the Environment, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 829, 855 (1997) ("Risk assessments typically follow
an elaborate procedure that makes them malleable, expensive, and time consuming."). But see
Jonathan S. Masur, Cost-BenefitAnalysis Under Trump: A Comment on Dan Farber'sRegulatory

Review in Anti-Regulatory Times, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 665, 670-71 (2019) (arguing that the
experience with CBA under Trump demonstrates that CBA is not nearly as malleable as its critics
maintained).
129.

See, e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety

Admin., 494 F.3d 188, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (scrutinizing the agency's modeling choices and
rejecting the regulation on the basis that it did not articulate a reasonable explanation for dubious

modeling decisions); Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 374 F.3d 1209, 1218 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (same); Corrosion-Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1991)
(striking down the EPA's proposed asbestos regulation because it would create costs in excess of
benefits). See generally Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 121 (surveying a large number of cases in
which courts have evaluated agency CBAs and finding many cases in which regulations have been
rejected for faulty CBAs).

130.
131.

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (2018).
Id. § 7543(b).
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the past, including waivers from the Obama administration that
remained in effect after the Trump EPA announced its intention to roll
back Obama-era CAFE standards.1 32 Pursuant to that waiver,
California announced an agreement with several major automakers
that it would promulgate Obama's CAFE standards as its own, and that
these automakers would abide by them.1 33 Because of the size and
importance of the California market, and the difficulty of
manufacturing different automobiles with different levels of fuel
economy for different states, the California rules would likely regulate
fuel economy for all cars manufactured and sold throughout the
country.1'3 4
In September 2019, the Trump administration announced that it
was withdrawing California's preemption waiver.1 35 It made two
arguments. First, it argued that California did not need stricter fuel
economy standards to meet "compelling and extraordinary
conditions," as required by the Clean Air Act.1 36 According to the
Trump administration, California's standards were primarily intended
to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and help curb climate change.1 37
But, the Trump agencies argued, because climate change is a global
problem, and California's carbon emissions do not remain in California
or affect only Californians, California cannot claim to have an
"extraordinary condition" that warrants particular standards.1'3 8

132

See Vehicle Emissions CaliforniaWaivers and Authorizations, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/

state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations

[https://

perma.cc/9GNY-2C5Y] (providing a list of federal register notices for Californian waivers);
California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Request, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissionsvehicles-and-engines/california-greenhouse-gas-waiver-request [https://perma.cc/J44K-R99D]
(discussing Californian waivers and providing related documents associated with waiver requests).
133. California and Major Automakers Reach Groundbreaking Framework Agreement on
Clean Emission Standards, OFF. Gov. GAVIN NEWSOM (July 25, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/
2019/07/25/california-and-major-automakers-reach-groundbreaking-framework-agreement-onclean-emission-standards [https://perma.cc/DCX2-E65S].
134. Id. (noting that the framework agreement maintains a national
participating automakers who will sell these cleaner cars nationwide).

approach for

135. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National
Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85-86; 49 C.F.R.
pts. 531, 533) [hereinafter SAFE One National Program Rule].
136. Id. at 51,340; 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(B).
137.

See SAFE One National Program Rule, supra note 135, at 51,329.

138. Id. at 51,339 ("The GHG emissions from California cars are no more relevant to the
pollution problem at issue (i.e., climate change) as it impacts California than are the GHG
emissions from cars being driven in New York, London, Johannesburg, or Tokyo .... ").
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Second, the Trump administration argued that state fuel economy
standards were preempted by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act,
which does not allow for state waivers.1 39 That law states:
When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this
chapter is in effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may
not adopt or enforce a law or regulation related to fuel economy
standards or average fuel economy standards for automobiles
covered by an average fuel economy standard under this chapter. 4 0

This creates an obvious conflict with the Clean Air Act, which-in the
context of fuel economy standards-would seem to explicitly permit
precisely the sort of state action that the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act prohibits. The only two courts to have confronted
this issue both resolved it in favor of the Clean Air Act, and thus in
favor of the state seeking a preemption waiver.'14 Nonetheless, the
Trump administration asserted that those courts were wrong and that
states should be categorically preempted from issuing their own fuel
economy standards under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.4 2
Notably, the Trump administration claimed that it should be
entitled to Chevron deference with respect to both of these
arguments.1 43 Like the federal CAFE standards themselves, the rule
withdrawing California's waiver was jointly promulgated by the EPA
and NHTSA, the agencies charged with administering the relevant
sections of the Clean Air Act 4 4 and Energy Policy and Conservation
Act, 4 s respectively. Relatedly, the EPA and NHTSA took the position
that the withdrawal of California's waiver was not a "rule" under

139.

Id. at 51,311.

140. 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2018).
141. See Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295,
399 (D. Vt. 2007); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1190 (E.D.
Cal. 2007).
142.

SAFE One National Program Rule, supra note 135, at 51,314.

143.

See id. at 51,333, 51,351.

144. Id. at 51,351 ("Where states are now adopting standards ... far removed from NAAQS
attainment planning or more specifically directed at global air pollution, EPA as the agency
charged with implementing the Clean Air Act is acting well within that role in setting out an
interpretation that aligns with Congressional intent." (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984))).
145. Id. at 51,320 ("However, to the extent there is any ambiguity, NHTSA is the expert
agency and its regulation adopted in this document is entitled to deference.").
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Executive Order 12,866.146 It thus declined to perform a cost-benefit
analysis.
The withdrawal of California's Clean Air Act waiver is consistent
with our theme of Chevronizing around CBA. Here, too, the Trump
administration has deployed a series of legal arguments, coupled with
a claim for Chevron deference, to evade consideration of the policy
consequences of its actions. We evaluate the merits of these legal
arguments in greater depth in the next Part.
D.

General Service Lamps

In the waning days of the Obama administration, the Department
of Energy ("DOE") issued a regulation that would have banned the
sale of traditional incandescent light bulbs in 2020."?7 The regulation,
along with the 2007 law that authorized it, led to the rapid growth of a
market in energy-efficient light bulbs, including fluorescent, halogen,
and LED.1 48 However, demand for the cheaper, less efficient
incandescent light bulb remained strong, and the industry opposed the
Obama regulation.1 49 In September 2019, the DOE issued a final rule
withdrawing the Obama regulation. 5 1
The replacement 2019 regulation was accompanied by a quite
mysterious cost-benefit analysis purporting to show that the regulation
would reduce costs. Based on the industry's "confidential estimates of
total domestic shipments for the years 2015 to 2018," and with its
commitment to data transparency temporarily forgotten, 151 the DOE
argued that its regulation would reduce costs in the form of a
"reduction in uncertainty" equal to roughly $50 million to $200 million
per year.1 2 As far as we can understand, the "reduction in uncertainty"
referred to uncertainty about whether the DOE itself would ultimately
146. Id. at 51,352 ("EPA's action here, however, is not a rule as defined by Executive Order
12866, consistent with its previous actions on waiver requests, and is therefore exempt from
review by the Office of Management and Budget as required for rules and regulations by
Executive Order 12,866.").
147.

Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for General Service

Lamps, 82 Fed. Reg. 7276, 7322 (Jan. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Energy Conservation Standards].
148.

Nadja Popovich, America's Light Bulb Revolution, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2019), https://

nyti.ms/37RyiMO [https://perma.cc/4E8Q-QRDQ].
149. Id.
150.

Energy Conservation Program: Definition for General Service Lamps, 84 Fed. Reg.

46,661, 46,662 (Sept. 5, 2019) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430).
151. Id. at 46,674.
152. Id.
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decide on a new efficiency rule allowing the sale of incandescent light
bulbs or would instead trigger the statute's backstop, which would have
barred traditional incandescent bulbs. Because the industry cannot
predict what the DOE will do, it must be prepared to deliver a large
volume of light bulbs that will satisfy demand regardless of what
happens. This, of course, would be a larger volume than if the industry
knew that incandescent light bulbs would be barred or not. Though
commenters were concerned that this regulation would cause
environmental harm, the DOE rejected these concerns on the ground
that it has not yet determined what the energy conservation standard
will be."5 3
It is hard to make sense of this analysis. The practical effect of the
regulation was to allow incandescent light bulbs to be sold in 2020. A
proper cost-benefit analysis would estimate the effects on the
environment and compare them to the consumer surplus from sales of
incandescent bulbs. Since this analysis has not been performed, we do
not know whether withdrawal would be cost-justified."' But the effect
on inventory is a second-order concern, and the argument that the
regulation has no environmental effect is disingenuous, because the
DOE has not yet decided what a future conservation standard will be.
The result of this deregulation will be that more incandescent light
bulbs will be sold and used than would have been had the deregulation
never occurred. If pretending otherwise is not arbitrary and capricious,
we do not know what is.
II. CHEVRONIZING AROUND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The preceding examples demonstrate that CBA is not as
malleable as some of its critics have contended."5 For its repeals of the
Obama-era mercury regulation, the CPP, and fuel economy standards,
the Trump EPA was able to massage some of the numbers at the
margin, but could not bring itself to argue that the new mercury and
CPP regulations were cost-justified. With respect to the repeal of the
general service lamp standards and its initial CBA of the fuel economy
standards, the Trump EPA did gin up phony CBAs, but their phoniness
was plain to anyone who cared to examine them.
153.

Id. at 46,670-71.

154. The Obama regulation did not include a cost-benefit analysis on the ground that the
regulation was not a "major rule." Energy Conservation Standards, supra note 147, at 7320.
155.

See supra note 128. and accompanying text.

2021]

CHEVRONIZING AROUND CBA

1137

By way of contrast, it is notable that the Trump administration
made most of its significant deregulatory inroads in areas where CBA
has not traditionally been required, or in ways that are not normally
subject to CBA. Thus, for example, the reduction of resources for
enforcement is not subject to a cost-benefit requirement;1 56 nor is the
reduction in reliance on scientific advisory boards." The withdrawal
of regulations under the Congressional Review Act does not require a
CBA.' 58 Similarly, the Federal Communications Commission was able
to withdraw Obama's net neutrality regulation without offering a
CBA.' 59 The Trump administration's recent revision of regulations for
implementing the Endangered Species Act also involved a regulatory
area in which agencies have not used cost-benefit analysis and are, in
fact, prohibited by statute from taking economic considerations into
account.1 60 And the administration's immigration-related actions,
including the withdrawal of the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals ("DACA") program, generally did not require CBAs for
various reasons. In the case of DACA, for example, cost-benefit

156. Alex Leary, Trump AdministrationPushes To Deregulate with Less Enforcement, WALL
ST. J. (June 23, 2019, 7:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-pushes-toderegulate-with-less-enforcement-11561291201
[https://perma.cc/FDD5-XTUC] (noting that
Trump attempted to deregulate "by not hiring people to do the work of enforcing rules that are
on the books").
157.

Jill Colvin, Trump Aims To Slash Number of FederalAdvisory Committees, ASSOCIATED

PRESS (June 14, 2019), https://apnews.com/4e36550332c74894b8b87f4ed51aafff [https://perma.cc/
45NX-98DT].
158. Under the Congressional Review Act ("CRA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-08 (2018), Congress can
overturn a proposed agency rule by a joint resolution of disapproval. Id. § 802. Congress does not
need to justify its decision with cost-benefit analysis because the executive orders requiring CBA
are not applicable to Congress. The 1 1 5th Congress (2017-2018) overturned sixteen rules under
the CRA, whereas only one rule had previously been overturned since the law's passage in 1996.
MAEVE P. CAREY & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE CONGRESSIONAL

REVIEW ACT (CRA) 1 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10023.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2UB-

HGFB].
159. Historically, independent agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission
have not been subject to the same CBA requirements as traditional executive branch agencies.
According to one analysis, "E.O. 12866, like its predecessor orders that were issued by President

Ronald Reagan (E.O. 12291 and E.O. 12498), does not apply the cost-benefit analysis or OIRA
review to independent regulatory agencies such as the Federal Reserve Board and Securities and
Exchange Commission." MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43056, COUNTING
REGULATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 4 n.23

(2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43056.pdf [https://perma.cc/WY6T-L8E5].
160.

Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Listing Species and

Designating Critical Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg. 45,020, 45,024-25 (Aug. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 424).
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analysis was not required because the administration merely
abandoned the Obama administration's decision not to enforce certain
laws.16' Where CBA is required, the administration had to work around
CBA rather than disregard it completely. CBA created tension with
the Trump administration's deregulatory goals.
The Trump administration responded to this tension with a variety
of tactics designed to evade or frustrate cost-benefit analysis. Some of
these tactics were straightforward and relatively well understood.
Others were innovations. The Sections that follow categorize these
tactics and evaluate their legality. We conclude that most of them are
illegal or should be held to be illegal. But cracking down on these
actions would, in some cases, require courts to subject the Trump
administration's actions to a level of scrutiny that they have not
traditionally been willing to apply to administrative action.
In the cases of mercury, fuel economy, and the CPP, the
administration tried to evade CBA rather than falsify it. Its strategies
in these cases involved what this Article calls "Chevronizing around
branch's authority
over legal
CBA"-using the executive
interpretations to evade or nullify the results of cost-benefit analysis.
In the mercury case, the administration argued that while the Obamaera mercury regulation generated benefits greater than the costs, some
of those benefits-the co-benefits-did not count. These co-benefits
did not count because the agency was legally prohibited from issuing a
mercury regulation unless the mercury-related health benefits of the
regulation alone exceeded the costs. Here, the agency's argument was
based on Chevron Step Two: the EPA argued that the statute was
ambiguous, and thus the agency was entitled to deference in its
interpretation
excluding
co-benefits.
Similarly,
the
Trump
administration justified its withdrawal of California's Clean Air Act
waiver with reference to its authority under Chevron Step Two and
claimed that it was not even required to perform a cost-benefit analysis
of its policy choice. In its repeal of the CPP, by contrast, the EPA
operated at Chevron Step One: it argued that the statute
unambiguously prohibited the agency from regulating in the manner
dictated by the CPP, cost-benefit consequences notwithstanding.
161.

The cost-benefit test of E.O. 12,866 applies to "regulatory actions," Exec. Order No.

12,866 § 6(a)(3), (a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645-46 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2018), defined as actions leading up to a final rule or regulation designed to have the effect of
law, id. § 3(d)-(e). Thus, it does not apply to enforcement decisions. Cf Dep't of Homeland Sec.
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1914 (2020) (noting that the Department of
Homeland Security has "considerable flexibility in carrying out its responsibility").
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These two approaches are species of the same genus. In both cases, the
agency used an interpretation of the Clean Air Act to escape the
consequences of its cost-benefit analysis. Below, we analyze these two
efforts in depth.
A.

Chevronizing Around Cost-Benefit Analysis at Step Two:
The Cases of Mercury and Fuel Economy

1. Mercury. As we explained above, the section of the Clean Air
Act under which the Obama EPA regulated mercury requires that
regulation be "appropriate and necessary."1 62 The Trump EPA argued
that this language was ambiguous, that the EPA now interpreted the
language to exclude consideration of co-benefits, and that the EPA's
interpretation was entitled to deference under Chevron Step Two.1 63
This flavor of the Chevronizing strategy is potentially powerful
because regulatory statutes are frequently ambiguous. This ambiguity
creates interpretive space for the agency under Chevron, space that the
agency can use to craft a legal interpretation that excludes benefits or
costs. Still, an agency's authority under Chevron is not limitless. Even
if a statute is ambiguous, Step Two of the Chevron framework
nonetheless requires that that the executive branch's interpretation of
ambiguous language be "reasonable. "164
The meaning of this term has given rise to much scholarly debate.
Some scholars have taken the position that Chevron's two steps both
call for statutory construction: Step One asks "whether the text of the
agency's governing statute nullifies the agency's position," while Step
Two asks "whether other conventional tools of construction cast doubt
on the agency's position."1 65 Others have suggested that Chevron Step
Two calls for a more substantive type of review, possibly arbitrary and
capricious review under the APA.1 66 This version of Chevron Step Two

162.

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

163.

See supra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.

164.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).

165. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1253, 1278-80 (1997); see also Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron's Two
Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 614 (2009); Peter L. Strauss, "Deference"Is Too Confusing-Let's Call

Them "Chevron Space" and "Skidmore Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1162-65 (2012).
166. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in
Reviewing Agency Interpretationsof Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REV. 83, 127, 130-31 (1994); Catherine

M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2384-85 (2018).
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would direct a court to scrutinize the policy choices underlying the
agency's action, rather than merely engaging in a legalistic analysis of
the agency's statutory interpretation.1 67 Empirical studies of Chevron
have shown that appellate courts subscribe to each of these
interpretations at various times.1 68
Here, if Chevron Step Two were given any sort of substantive
content, we suspect that it would be fatal to the Trump EPA's repeal
of mercury regulations.1 69 That deregulation would create billions of

Still other scholars have argued that Chevron has only one step, see generally Matthew C.
Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009).

167.

See Sharkey, supra note 166, at 2383-84.

168.

Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV.

1, 34-35 (2017); Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 IND. L.J. 605, 638-40
(2014).
169. It is worth noting that, across a wide variety of legal contexts, courts will sometimes treat
the word "reasonable" as if it requires a comparison between costs and benefits. For examples
from federal regulatory law, see 45 AM. JUR. 2d Job Discrimination§§ 200, 210 (2019) (stating
that when determining whether an accommodation is reasonable under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, "courts are permitted to take into account the reasonableness of the cost of any
necessary workplace accommodation, the availability of alternatives therefor, or other
appropriate relief in order to achieve an equitable and appropriate remedy," and an employer
does not need to provide an accommodation if doing so would be "unduly costly, extensive,
substantial, or disruptive"); Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,511 n.30 (1981)
(discussing the requirement that the Consumer Product Safety Commission promulgate rules that
are reasonably necessary to eliminate an "unreasonable risk" of injury require "a generalized
balancing of costs and benefits"); 15 AM. JUR. 2d Civil Rights § 403 (2019) ("An accommodation
is reasonable under the Fair Housing Act if it is both efficacious and proportional to the costs to
implement it."). For examples from tort law, see McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554,
1558 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Ordinarily the innkeeper knows much more about the hazards of his trade
than the guest, and can take reasonable (=cost-justified) steps to reduce them, while ordinarily
the guest can do little to protect himself against them."); see also E. River S.S. Corp. v.

Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159
F.2d 169,173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.); Md. Cas. Co. v. City of Jackson, 493 So. 2d 955, 960 n.3
(Miss. 1986); People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 266-67
(1985); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376,386 (1976); FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES,
JR., OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS 467-68 (2d ed. 1986); W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B.
DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF

TORTS § 31 at 173 (5th ed. 1984). For examples from property law, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 826 (Am. L. Inst. 1975) (stating land use is unreasonable if "the gravity of the harm
o[u]tweighs the utility of the actor's conduct," or if "the harm caused by the conduct is serious
and the financial burden of compensating for this and similar harm to others would not make the
continuation of the conduct [n]ot feasible"); Kopecky v. Nat'l Farms, Inc., 510 N.W.2d 41, 48
(Neb. 1994) (holding that when a judge is unable to determine an invasion is unreasonable as a
matter of law, the jury decides the question of reasonableness after weighing the gravity of harm
against the utility of the actor's conduct); 12 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79C.06 (2019)
(stating that in the context of evaluating zoning changes, "courts have generally tried to balance
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dollars in net costs and would create no identified nonmonetary benefit
that might justify such a loss. That hardly seems reasonable, or, for that
matter, "appropriate and necessary."
There is a related problem with the EPA's interpretation that
renders it unreasonable. Under the Trump administration's view, the
EPA is allowed to limit pollution that generates mercury-related harms
and pollution that generates particulate matter-related harms, but it
cannot count both harms when evaluating a regulation that does
both. 70 It is hard to think of a justification for such an approach, and
the Trump administration did not supply one.
The problem with the Trump EPA's stance was that it could have
compelled the agency to engage in unnecessarily wasteful regulation.
Imagine that the EPA is considering a rule that limits emissions from
factories. The anticipated rule imposes costs of $1 billion on businesses
and results in lower emissions of two substances, X and Y. Suppose
further that the X reduction produces benefits of $0.9 billion and the Y
reduction produces benefits of $0.8 billion. The rule passes a costbenefit analysis because the joint benefits of $1.7 billion exceed the $1
billion cost.
Now, further suppose that two different laws authorize the EPA
to regulate X and Y. Call these law-X and law-Y. Each law imposes
different substantive standards. The EPA may regulate X only if
"appropriate and necessary," while the EPA may regulate Y only if
regulation "serves the public interest." Instead of issuing one
regulation to reduce emissions of both X and Y, the EPA could issue
separate regulations of X (under law-X) and Y (under law-Y).
However, regulation-X alone would impose costs of $0.7 billion, and
regulation-Y alone would impose costs of $0.6 billion, for a total of $1.3
billion. It would thus be optimal for the EPA to regulate both
chemicals with a single rule.
Suppose a court held that the statutory language was ambiguous
and the EPA deserved Chevron deference. The EPA then decided to
interpret the statute to exclude co-benefits and bar the single
regulation. Would a court hold that the EPA's regulation was
reasonable at Chevron Step Two?
We are pretty sure the answer would be "no." The standards
"appropriate and necessary" and "the public interest" do not exclude
the public gain from the particular provision against the private loss sustained by the property
owner").
170.

See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
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considerations of co-benefits. On the contrary, they invite the agency
to consider all relevant effects of the regulation. Excluding co-benefits
from the analysis would push the agency toward inefficient alternatives
and block regulations that would benefit public welfare. We do not
think a court could reasonably interpret these standards to require the
EPA to exclude co-benefits. Put more generally, it would seem
unreasonable for an agency to select-as a matter of that agency's
discretion-a legal interpretation that compels the agency to act
wastefully or inefficiently. Deliberately exercising agency discretion to
achieve unnecessarily wasteful ends seems the antithesis of
reasonableness.
To test this intuition, let us consider some more extreme cases.
Imagine that the EPA regulates under law-X and the co-benefit is now
something over which the EPA has no authority. Let us imagine that
the EPA could prove the co-benefit is reducing violent crime. The
regulated industry argues that the EPA cannot take this co-benefit into
account and therefore, the regulation should be struck down because
the costs exceed the authorized benefits.
The industry is wrong. The EPA should consider reductions in
violent crime-or, more precisely, reductions in deaths, injuries, and
property loss-as long as a causal relationship between the emissions
and violent crime can be established. The goal of regulation should be
to increase overall social welfare. This requires analyzing all of the
effects of a regulation, not merely the intended effects or those
specifically named by the statute.
Imagine, for example, that the regulation produces costs rather
than benefits-a "co-cost"-by, for example, increasing violent crime.
The EPA would be on firm ground if it put the relevant outcomes into
a cost-benefit analysis. The issue is not whether the regulation
produces benefits or costs by affecting behavior that the underlying
statute did not seek to influence; the issue is whether the benefits and
costs are actually borne by the relevant group of people and borne in a
way that is clear and measurable.
This last point is worth emphasizing. Virtually all regulations
affect behaviors across many dimensions. A pollution-control
regulation will typically reduce many types of emissions, not just one.'
It would be strange for the agency to ignore the effects of other types
of emissions-good or bad-just because the agency acts pursuant to a
171.

Plan).

See supra Part LB (discussing the various reductions in pollutants from the Clean Power

2021]

CHEVRONIZING AROUND CBA

1143

statute that regulates only the one emission type. The same regulation
could, by increasing the cost of goods produced by the factory, have a
range of other effects -on the safety of products built with the factory's
inputs, on employment, or on working conditions in the factory.
Similarly, regulation of fuel economy standards can affect the amount
of fuel consumed and the price of automobiles, but will also affect
pollution, traffic fatalities, and more. These effects are unavoidable, so
if the agency is not allowed to take them into account, its regulations
will often cause great harm. Indeed, the vast majority of costs and
benefits that figured into the Trump administration's CBA of its fuel
economy standards are actually co-costs and co-benefits: increased or
reduced traffic fatalities, environmental harms, and so forth.' Yet the
Trump administration continued to consider co-costs and co-benefits
in this context without any recognition that it was acting inconsistently
with its approach to mercury.
In its defense of the mercury regulation repeal, the Trump EPA
hedged a bit by suggesting a more restricted version of its rule against
considering co-benefits. It argued that the problem with the mercury
regulation was that the "primary" benefit was the reduction of nonmercury emissions.173 We can see the force of this argument by
considering a semi-hypothetical example. Imagine that the EPA wants
to reduce cigarette smoking because of its public health effects and so
issues an environmental regulation that limits how much cigarette
smoke a person may produce. Then the EPA conducts a cost-benefit
analysis in which it finds that virtually all the benefits come from
preventing the deaths of smokers themselves rather than from secondhand smoke "pollution" caused by their "emissions." It is evident that
the agency is trying to regulate in a way outside its authority-which
here belongs to the Food and Drug Administration. A fair
interpretation of the authorizing statutes suggests that the EPA may
not regulate cigarette smoking, and it cannot avoid this restriction by
purporting to regulate smoke emissions.
One can imagine a similar argument even when an agency issues
rules that affect outcomes within its authority. Imagine that Congress
tells the EPA to regulate mercury emissions strictly, but to regulate
particulate matter emissions with a light touch. The EPA then issues a
regulation that strictly regulates both types of emissions and justifies
the regulation with a cost-benefit analysis in which the effects on

172.

See supra Part I.C.1.

173.

See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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particulate matter play the dominant role. Here, an argument could be
made that the EPA acted improperly. But the actual mercury rule
presents the opposite scenario. The standard for regulating particulate
matter emissions is what is "requisite to protect the public health."1 74
The Supreme Court has held that this requires the EPA to regulate
particulate matter emissions without regard to cost'-which is to say,
even more stringently than it regulates mercury.1 76 On these terms,
then, the EPA's choice is quite proper.
It is important to emphasize that if this provision of the Clean Air
Act unambiguously barred consideration of co-benefits, then the EPA
would be obligated, at Chevron Step One, not to consider them in its
regulatory decisions. This is the position the Trump EPA took with
respect to the CPP, which we discuss below. But this was not the Trump
EPA's view of the statute authorizing it to regulate mercury, and we
suspect it is highly unlikely that a court would ever hold that
"appropriate and necessary" unambiguously sbars consideration of cobenefits. 7 Here, the Trump EPA's refusal to take co-benefits into
account was the agency's own choice - an exercise of the agency's
policy discretion. The agency deliberately selected an interpretation
that would force it to create more costs than benefits. Such an attempt
to Chevronize around cost-benefit analysis should not be deemed
"reasonable."
2. Fuel Economy. The EPA and NHTSA's claims to Chevron
deference in withdrawing California's Clean Air Act waiver raise
different issues. Consider first the EPA's argument that California did
not face "compelling and extraordinary conditions" that necessitate a
waiver.1 78 The EPA argued that "the term 'extraordinary' should refer
to circumstances that are specific to California."'7 9 "Extraordinary"
means "going beyond what is usual, regular, or customary," or
174.
175.
176.

42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2018).
Whitman v. Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. 457, 466-67 (2001).
Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 756 (2015) ('"Appropriate and necessary' is a far more

comprehensive criterion than 'requisite to protect the public health'; read fairly and in context, as
we have explained, the term plainly subsumes consideration of cost.").
177.

In another case, the D.C. Circuit approved the EPA's reliance on co-benefits. See U.S.

Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579,625 (D.C. Cir. 2016). If the Obama EPA exercised its discretion
properly to consider co-benefits, then the Trump EPA's reversal, without any explanation based
on policy considerations, seems arbitrary.

178.

42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(B).

179.

SAFE One National Program Rule, supra note 135, at 51,341.
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"exceptional,"1 80 and the statute is specifically meant to allow waivers
for particular states while excluding others.18' Accordingly, the Trump
EPA's interpretation of the statute appears reasonable at minimum,
and it is perhaps even the best interpretation of the statute.
What is more dubious was the EPA's claim that "while effects
related to climate change in California could be substantial, they are
not sufficiently different from the conditions in the nation as a whole
to justify separate State standards."1 82 California is certainly not the
only state to have been affected by climate change. But it has been
affected in a manner-including the outbreak of vast wildfires,
accompanied by power blackouts meant to reduce the incidence of
such fires, among other things-that is different and arguably more
severe than most other states.1 83 Even though the EPA is entitled to
Chevron deference as to its interpretation of the Clean Air Act, its
conclusion that California does not meet the terms of the statute is
subject to arbitrary and capricious review under the APA.1 84 As we
have noted, arbitrary and capricious review is often-though not
always-quite limited.1 85 But if a court conducts a more searching
inquiry, we suspect that the EPA's determination is unlikely to survive.
With respect to the conflict between the Clean Air Act and the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act, the outcome is equally uncertain.
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act explicitly requires NHTSA
to consider "the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the
Government on fuel economy" when setting fuel economy
standards.1 86 Courts have held that when the EPA grants California a
preemption waiver, this waiver effectively transforms California's fuel
economy standards into federal standards and requires that NHTSA

180. Extraordinary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE,
webster.com/dictionary/extraordinary [https://perma.cc/G48V-28GK].

https://www.merriam-

181.

42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).

182.

SAFE One National Program Rule, supra note 135, at 51,344.

183.

The Climate Connection to California'sWildfires, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2020), https://

nyti.ms/2DLpT4I [https://perma.cc/Z5NR-TUF9].
184. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).
185. Compare Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 122, at 1358, 1362 (finding that the
overwhelming majority of agency decisions survive "arbitrary and capricious" challenges at the
Supreme Court), with Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 121, at 590-603 (finding higher rates of reversal
in the lower courts than Gersen & Vermeule).

186.

49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (2018).
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take them into account.' 87 It was on this basis that two federal courts
held that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act does not preempt
states from promulgating fuel economy regulations pursuant to an
EPA waiver.' 88 Once California has obtained an EPA waiver, its
standards have the status of federal regulations, and the Energy Policy
and Conservation Act cannot block them.
Of course, these cases were decided in the presence of federal
agencies that were favorably inclined toward the state regulations at
issue. The federal government was not a party to either lawsuit, and
the courts did not refer to Chevron deference or the agencies' position.
But it is nonetheless entirely possible that those cases could have come
out differently had the courts been required to defer to reasonable
agency constructions of the statutes. That, in turn, again raises the
question of whether an agency interpretation of a statute can be
reasonable under Chevron Step Two if it compels the agency to take
an action that is not cost-benefit justified. An honest cost-benefit
analysis, had the EPA and NHTSA been required to produce one,
would likely show that denying California a Clean Air Act waiver
created costs in excess of benefits. Indeed, that is what a (more) honest
cost-benefit analysis of the Trump administration's fuel economy
standards demonstrated. Yet here, because no cost-benefit analysis
was produced, it would be challenging for a court to puncture the EPA
and NHTSA's result. It is thus possible that the withdrawal of
California's waiver would survive a court challenge.
B.

Chevronizing Around Cost-Benefit Analysis at Step One:
The Clean Power Plan

As with its approach to repealing the mercury regulation, the
Trump administration's strategy with regard to repealing the CPP
represented a type of Chevronizing around CBA. Here, too, the
administration was faced with an unfavorable CBA. However much it
attempted to massage the numbers, its analysis revealed that repealing
the CPP would create huge net costs and lead to many unnecessary

187. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1168-69, 1172 (E.D.
Cal. 2007).
188. Id. at 1172; Green Mountain Chrysler v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 348-50 (D. Vt.
2007). The courts held, in the alternative, that the Energy Policy Conservation Act's preemption
provision should be read very narrowly, and that it did not preempt the state fuel economy

standards. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1174-75; Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 330-35.
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deaths.1 89 In response, the Trump EPA took the position that its hands
were tied-the Clean Air Act allowed only regulations that could be
applied to a single power plant and did not allow regulation of the
overall mixture of fuel sources used in a state.1 90 In advancing this
argument, the EPA did not claim that it was entitled to deference
under Chevron. Instead, it argued that the statute unambiguously
prohibited regulation of the type employed in the CPP.19'
On its own terms, this is a dubious conclusion. Recall that the
Clean Air Act requires the EPA to implement the "best system of
emission reduction."' 92 The word "system" is amenable to a wide
variety of interpretations.1 93 The standard definition of the word would
include large-scale plans favoring some types of energy production
over others.1 94 In addition, the Clean Air Act never states explicitly that
the only permissible standards are those that can be applied within
boundaries of each regulated source. The Trump EPA inferred this
from the words "existing source" and "application,"'9 5 but that is not
the only reasonable interpretation of those words, particularly when
they are read in context with the phrase "system of emission
reduction."
Nonetheless, one can see why the Trump EPA adopted this legal
strategy. This version of Chevronizing around CBA at Step One-if it
were upheld by the courts-would have served three overlapping
purposes for the Trump administration. First, it would have justified
the agency's decision to repeal the CPP, despite the fact that the CPP
creates benefits well in excess of costs. It would also have insulated the
repeal decision from arbitrary and capricious review under the APAif the CPP was unlawful, it could not be arbitrary and capricious to

189.

See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.

190. Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 68, at 32,556; see also supra notes 81-87 and
accompanying text.
191. Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 68, at 32,527 ("After reconsidering the relevant
statutory text, structure, and purpose, the Agency now recognizes that Congress 'spoke to the
precise question' of the scope of CAA section 111(a)(1) and clearly precluded the unsupportable
reading of that provision asserted in the CPP. Accordingly, this action repeals the CPP."); see also
supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.

192.

42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2018).

193.

Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 68, at 32,528.

194. See System, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/system [https://perma.cc/P57K-WQ6C]
(defining "system" as "a
regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole").
195.

Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 68, at 32,523.
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repeal it. Second, it would bind the hands of any future EPA, operating
under a different president, that might attempt to reinstate the CPP. If
the Clean Air Act is unambiguous, the views of any given EPA as to
the statute's meaning are irrelevant.1 96 Third, this approach would not
have required the EPA to argue that the statute is ambiguous and that
its interpretation-which would generate greater costs than benefitsis reasonable. As we suggested in the prior Section, courts may be
reluctant to accept as reasonable a discretionary interpretation that
produces costs in excess of benefits and forecloses the most efficient
options.1 97 Here, the EPA attempted to escape that bind by arguing
that it possesses no interpretive discretion.19 8
Arguing that an interpretation is permitted under Chevron, as in
the case of mercury, creates different types of legal risks than arguing
that an interpretation is mandated by an unambiguous statute, as with
the CPP.1 99 But in both cases, an agency that does not have a strong
argument on policy grounds for repealing existing regulations has
resorted to legal interpretation as a mechanism for evading CBA.
CONCLUSION

The Trump administration's deregulatory project exposed some
serious tensions in the structure of the administrative state. On the one
hand, a tradition of judicial deference to the executive, exemplified by
the Chevron doctrine, suggests that when the governing statute is
ambiguous, courts will-or should-give Trump a free hand to roll
back regulation. Congress gave the president discretion over policy,
and the question whether to regulate or deregulate falls within that
policy discretion. Courts should therefore defer to the president's

196.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) ("If the

intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
197.

See supra Part IIA.1.

198. Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 68, at 32,523 ("The text of the CAA is
inconsistent with that interpretation, and the context, structure, and legislative history confirm
that the statutory interpretation underlying the CPP was not a permissible construction of the
Act.").
199. It is possible that, in the course of litigation, the Trump EPA might have attempted to
argue in the alternative that it was entitled to Chevron deference in the event that a court viewed
the language of the Clean Air Act as ambiguous. However, this line of argument would likely
have been foreclosed by the Chenery doctrine, which does not permit agencies to rely upon
arguments or justifications that were not offered at the time a regulation was promulgated. See
Amy R. Motomura, Rethinking Administrative Law's Chenery Doctrine: Lessons from Patent
Appeals at the Federal Circuit, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 817, 822-23 (2014).
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policy judgments. On the other hand, the rise of cost-benefit analysis
suggests that courts should push back against the executive branch
when its regulatory decisions violate a cost-benefit test, even if the
relevant statutory language is broad and ambiguous. The president's
choice to regulate or deregulate any particular industry is therefore
constrained by facts about the world-people's preferences and the
costs of regulatory compliance-which the president is required to
respect.
We see three ways to resolve this tension. First, one could grab the
Chevron horn of the dilemma and argue that in the presence of an
ambiguous statute, the executive branch can do what it wants, costbenefit analysis notwithstanding. Indeed, the cost-benefit requirement
itself began as an initiative by the executive branch and was only later
enforced by courts. And even then, it was enforced only sporadically.2 00
The Trump administration could have argued that what the president
giveth, the president may taketh away. But at minimum, this window
of discretion appears to be narrowing. Courts have increasingly found
an unambiguous cost-benefit requirement in the statutory language
that agencies are required to enforce.2 01 If this trend continues,
executive discretion will further erode. We suspect that the sloppy costbenefit analyses used by the Trump administration would be rejected
by the courts as arbitrary and capricious, further strengthening this
emerging cost-benefit norm.
Second, one could go the other direction and argue that executive
branch administrative discretion is a myth or, at least, is becoming one.
Even where statutory language is ambiguous, the executive branch
must comply with cost-benefit analysis, or perhaps even try to
maximize social welfare. Courts will push back if the branch does not.

&

200. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-56 (D.C. Cir. 2011); CorrosionProof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201,1218-23 (5th Cir. 1991). See generally Jonathan S. Masur
Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (2018)
[hereinafter Masur & Posner, JudicialRole] (discussing judicial review of agencies' defective costbenefit analyses for regulations).

201.

See Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 749 (2015) ("The statute expressly requires the

Agency to consider cost (alongside other specified factors) when imposing beyond-the-floor
standards."); Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148-49 (setting aside a Securities and Exchange
Commission action under the APA for "inconsistently and opportunistically fram[ing] the costs
and benefits of the rule"); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and ArbitrarinessReview, 41
HARV. ENV'T L. REV. 1, 11-13 (2017) (describing why some judges may favor cost-benefit
balancing as a check on administrative agencies while others may avoid it because they are not
well trained in resolving empirical issues).
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But this view raises numerous difficult and familiar questions. Do the
courts have the capacity to second-guess the judgments of experts in
regulatory agencies?2 02 Many such judgments involve technical
questions, including, for example, which of a number of conflicting
studies is most credible and how valuations should be extrapolated
from limited data. Courts are notoriously skittish, probably for good
reason, about overruling the executive's judgment with regard to
technical issues over which the courts have substantially less expertise,
even though technical analyses can be misused to support politically
preferred outcomes.
Third, there may be a middle way. One possibility is that the
executive branch's discretion is at a maximum when it chooses whether
to regulate and how much, and at a minimum when it seeks to eliminate
or curtail existing regulations. Consider, for example, the choice
whether to issue a strict regulation or a moderate regulation. Imagine
that both regulations pass a cost-benefit analysis in the sense of being
preferable to the status quo, but they generate different wealth levels
and perhaps distributional consequences and involve different levels of
uncertainty about consequences. Under existing law, a court is likely
to defer to the executive's choice, and this may well be the proper
approach. By contrast, if the executive seeks to replace an earlier
modest regulation with a strict regulation, or a strict regulation with a
modest regulation or no regulation at all, a court should be more likely
to insist that the revision be cost justified.2 03 Experience with the status
quo regulation, and the economic analysis and related materials that
the government had used to justify the regulation, might give a court
the information it needs to review the regulatory reform.
Whatever the preferred solution, our main point is that when a
statute neither unambiguously permits or prohibits cost-benefit
analysis, the tradition of Chevron deference and the emerging costbenefit norm are in tension-and one will have to give. The Trump
administration laid this contradiction bare by so obviously trying to use
Chevron to evade cost-benefit analysis, and now courts may have to
decide what to do. The tension reflects an underlying theoretical
202. See generally Masur & Posner, Judicial Role, supra note 200 (discussing judicial review
of agencies' defective cost-benefit analyses for regulations); see also cases cited in supra note 200.
203. This would involve a change to existing law, under which the Supreme Court has typically
required the same degree of explanation from an agency for a regulatory change, or deregulation,
as it has for an agency's original regulation. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502,

514 (2009).
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uncertainty about how much discretion the executive should have over
public policy, whether courts should curtail that discretion, and, if so,
to what degree. This tension is also reflected in the efforts by
commentators and some judges to revive the nondelegation doctrine,
which would require Congress to curtail the discretion of the executive
by engaging in regulation itself rather than delegating regulatory
authority to agencies.2 04 The problem with the nondelegation doctrine
is that it imposes a burden on Congress for which it lacks institutional
capacity, due to the highly complex and ever-changing challenges of
regulation. 205 A cost-benefit norm that constrains the executive without
imposing new burdens on Congress may be the solution to this
problem.

204.

See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct 2116, 2123-24 (2019) (describing the limits of

Congress's power to delegate to agencies).

205. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION 27-38 (2018) (explaining the
rationale from expertise for delegating substantial authority to agencies).

